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Sitting as "Superarbitrators" or According "Great
Deference?" Pennsylvania Courts and the Essence
Test Under PERA Since State System of Higher
Education (Cheyney University) v. State College and
University Professional Association (PSEA-NEA)
I. INTRODUCTION
The Pennsylvania Public Employe Relations Act (PERA) dic-
tates that the final step in the resolution of grievances or disputes
arising out of the interpretation of a public-sector collective bar-
gaining agreement must be final and binding arbitration.! This
requirement is a reflection of the state legislature's strong histori-
cal preference for swift and efficient means of settling labor dis-
putes between public employers and their employees.2 Pennsyl-
1. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1101.903 (2002). In full, the pertinent statute reads as fol-
lows:
Arbitration of disputes or grievances arising out of the interpretation of the provi-
sions of a collective bargaining agreement is mandatory. The procedure to be
adopted is a proper subject of bargaining with the proviso that the final step shall
provide for a binding decision by an arbitrator or a tri-partite board of arbitrators as
the parties may agree. Any decisions of the arbitrator or arbitrators requiring legis-
lation will only be effective if such legislation is enacted:
(1) If the parties cannot voluntarily agree upon the selection of an arbitrator, the
parties shall notify the Bureau of Mediation of their inability to do so. The Bureau of
Mediation shall then submit to the parties the names of seven arbitrators. Each part
shall alternately strike a name until one remains. The public employer shall strike
the first name. The person remaining shall be the arbitrator.
(2) The costs of arbitration shall be shared equally by the parties. Fees paid to arbi-
trators shall be based on a schedule established by the Bureau of Mediation.
Id.
2. See 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1101.101 (2002). The legislature's preference is reflected
in PERA's introductory provisions that declare, in pertinent part:
[T]hat it is the public policy of this Commonwealth and the purpose of this act to
promote orderly and constructive relationships between all public employers and
their employes . . . Unresolved disputes between the public employer and its em-
ployes are injurious to the public and the General Assembly is therefore aware that
adequate means must be established for minimizing them and providing for their
resolution.
Id.
Regarding preference for arbitration specifically, see Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v.
Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1969). Long ago, the Third Circuit pronounced its
awareness "of the strong public policy of encouraging the peaceful settlement of industrial
disputes by means of the device of arbitration." Id. Pennsylvania's highest state court has
repeatedly noted the same: See Cmty. Coll. of Beaver County v. Cmty. Coll. of Beaver
County, Soc'y of the Faculty (PSEA-NEA), 375 A.2d 1267, 1272 (Pa. 1977); Leechburg Area
579
580 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 41
vania's courts have also chosen to further promote arbitration as a
means of settling disputes in the public-employment labor-
relations setting by adopting a circumscribed standard of review of
arbitral awards, commonly known as the "essence test."3
The essence test, in its original and purest form, commands that
an arbitrator's award will not be disturbed by the judiciary so long
as it draws its "essence" from the governing collective bargaining
agreement.4 That is, as long as the arbitrator's interpretation of
the collective bargaining agreement can, in any rational way, be
derived from the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, an
appellate court, or a trial court sitting as an appellate court, has
no business substituting its interpretation for that of the arbitra-
tor's merely because they find their own interpretation to be more
rational, reasonable or equitable.5
Sch. Dist. v. Dale, 424 A.2d 1309, 1312 (Pa. 1981); Scranton Fed'n of Teachers, Local 1147,
AFT v. Scranton Sch. Dist., 444 A.2d 1144, 1147 (Pa. 1982); County of Centre v. Musser, 548
A.2d 1194, 1199-1200 (Pa. 1988); Greater Johnstown Area Vocational-Technical Sch. v.
Greater Johnstown Area Vocational-Technical Educ. Ass'n, 553 A.2d 913, 914 (Pa. 1989);
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd. v. Indep. State Stores
Union, 553 A.2d 948, 951 (Pa. 1989).
3. See Cmty. Coll. of Beaver County, 375 A.2d at 1272.
4. Although suggestions of the essence test can be found in Pennsylvania case law as
early as 1964, see H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. United Saw, File and Steel Products Workers of
Am., 333 F.2d 596 (3d Cir. 1964); Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123 (3d
Cir. 1969); and Teamsters Local Union No. 77 v. Pennsylvania Tpk. Comm'n, 331 A.2d 588
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975), the origins of the essence test in Pennsylvania are most frequently
traced to Community College of Beaver County v. Community College of Beaver County,
Society of the Faculty (PSEA/NEA), 375 A.2d 1267 (Pa. 1977), where the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court explicitly leant its approval to the U.S. Supreme Court's essence test. Id. at
1274. The U.S. Supreme Court's essence test was established in a line of cases commonly
known as the "Steelworker's Trilogy." United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960). In those cases, the Court first championed the use of arbitration as a means of
settling labor disputes.
5. See Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593. In Enterprise, Justice Brennan
announced that "[t]he refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the
proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements." Id. at 596. Justice
Brennan went on to make the oft-quoted statements that "an arbitrator is confined to in-
terpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dis-
pense his own brand of industrial justice" and that his "award is legitimate only so long as
it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 597 (emphasis added).
In explanation, Justice Brennan opined that:
[P]lenary review by a court of the merits would make meaningless the provisions that
the arbitrator's decision is final, for in reality it would almost never be final ... [T]he
question of interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is a question for the
arbitrator. It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained for; and so far as
the arbitrator's decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no
business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from
his.
The Essence Test Under PERA
In theory, the essence test adds further security and finality to
the labor arbitrator's award and thereby better effectuates the
intent of the statute.6 After all, according to the statute, arbitra-
tion is supposed to be final and binding, not just an intermediate
step in the dispute resolution process.7 Additional reasons why
arbitration is favored in labor relations include cost, efficiency,
and freedom of contract.8 Proper application of the essence test
promotes the goal of favoring arbitration as a means of dispute
resolution in the public labor relations sector by providing speed,
predictability and finality. Improper application can undercut
that same goal by undermining the authority of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, and by dragging out, through extended ap-
peals, that which was intended to be a swift process.
The stature of the essence test is well established. It has been a
tenet of public labor relations law for many years in Pennsylvania
and elsewhere.9 Despite these deep roots, application of the test
remains a frequently litigated and heated area of controversy in
public sector labor-relations law. °
Id. at 599.
6. Id.
7. See supra note 1.
8. State Sys. of Higher Educ. (Cheyney Univ.) v. State Coll. & Univ. Professional Ass'n
(PSEA-NEA), 743 A.2d 405, 409 (Pa. 1999). Therein, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
summarized that:
It is axiomatic that the arbitration of labor disputes is highly valued and greatly fa-
vored in our Commonwealth. The benefits of arbitration are many. Arbitration is
swifter, less formal, and less expensive than traditional dispute resolution by courts.
Arbitration has been described as more responsive to individual needs and preferen-
tial in light of the ongoing relationship between employer and union. Perhaps most
importantly, arbitration has been seen as a prime force in the policy of reducing in-
dustrial strife.
Id. at 409-10.
9. See supra note 4.
10. See supra note 2. The most recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases applying or
examining the essence test under PERA include: Danville Area Sch. Dist. v. Danville Area
Educ. Ass'n, PSEA-NEA, 754 A.2d 1255 (Pa. 2000) and City of Easton v. Am. Fed'n of State,
County & Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 447, 756 A.2d 1107 (Pa. 2000). The most re-
cent and on point Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court cases are: Abington Sch. Dist. v.
Abington Sch. Serv. Personnel Ass'n / AFSCME, 744 A.2d 367 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000); York
County Transp. Auth. v. Teamsters Local Union #430, 46 A.2d 1208 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000);
Rochester Area Sch. Dist. v. Rochester Educ. Ass'n, PSEA-NEA, 747 A.2d 971 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2000); Penn-Delco Sch. Dist. v. Penn-Delco Educ. Ass'n, 754 A.2d 51 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2000); Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. Soister, 758 A.2d 742 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000); Greater
Nanticoke Area Sch. Dist. v. Greater Nanticoke Area Educ. Ass'n, 760 A.2d 1214 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2000); Greene County v. Dist. 2, United Mine Workers of Am., 778 A.2d 1259
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001); United Sch. Dist. v. United Educ. Ass'n, 781 A.2d 40 (Pa. Commw.




The problem with the essence test has been the many spins and
reiterations of it." When reviewing arbitral awards, courts have
displayed a natural tendency to want to overrule results they dis-
agree with, notwithstanding the limitations that the essence test
is supposed to place on their discretions. 2 To help side-step these
limitations, many Pennsylvania courts have manipulated the lan-
guage of the essence test to such an extent that they can still re-
verse labor arbitrators' awards. 3 Other courts have gone too far
in their abdication.'4 Meanwhile, these manipulations of the es-
sence test's language from one extreme to the other work to un-
dermine everything that the essence test stands for, i.e., promot-
ing and favoring the arbitration of disputes in public labor rela-
tions.'5
At first glance the different phraseology and wordings that have
been used throughout the years may seem to be mere semantics.
For example, a court's substitution of the word "reasonable" in
place of "rational" may not appear to be overly significant. 6 How-
ever, a closer look at the case law reveals that different iterations
of the test have had a real impact on the outcome of the cases (i.e.,
affirming vs. overruling). 7 The changing of a word here and there
can, and has, opened up the floodgates to reversal opportunities
where the courts should be assuming the role of deference that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has purportedly commanded
through their adoption of the essence test.8 As is so often the
11. Cheyney, 743 A.2d at 409. "[T]he court has stated different variations of the appli-
cable standard which has led to a less than uniform proclamation of the appropriate degree
of deference that a reviewing court should accord to a labor arbitrator's decision." Id.
12. City of Easton v. Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, 756 A.2d 1107,
1113 (Pa. 2000) (Cappy, J., dissenting).
13. See Cheyney, 743 A.2d at 411-13, wherein the Pennsylvania Supreme Court gave a
"brief review of these varying iterations of the essence test." Id. For more in depth analy-
sis see also Michael D. Matter, Manifestly Unreasonable: Misapplying the Essence Test
Standard of Review of Arbitration Awards in Pennsylvania's Public Sector -- Are the Courts
Abusing Their Discretion?, 103 DICK. L. REV. 667 (1999).
14. See Cheyney, 743 A.2d at 411-13; and Matter, supra note 13.
15. See Cheyney, 743 A.2d at 411-13; and Matter, supra note 13.
16. See Cheyney, 743 A.2d at 411-13; and Matter, supra note 13.
17. See and compare Dauphin County Technical Sch. Educ. Ass'n v. Dauphin County
Area Vocational Technical Sch. Bd., 398 A.2d 168 (Pa. 1978); Dale, 424 A.2d at 1309;
Leechburg Area Sch. Dist. v. Leechburg Educ. Ass'n, 380 A.2d 1203 (Pa. 1977); Philadel-
phia Housing Auth. v. Union of Security Officers, 455 A.2d 625 (Pa. 1983); Musser, 548
A.2d at 1194; Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 553 A.2d at 948; Delaware County v. Dela-
ware County Prison Employees Indep. Union, 713 A.2d 1135 (Pa. 1998); and Scranton
Fed'n of Teachers, 444 A.2d at 1144.
18. See supra note 4.
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case, the manner in which the reviewing court phrases the issue
or legal standard tends to predetermine it's ultimate holdings.
As a result of the above-described confusion, Pennsylvania's
highest court has spoken on a number of occasions, to clarify and
instruct the state's lower courts on the proper application of the
essence test.19 Their most recent such attempt came in 1999 in a
case called State System of Higher Education (Cheyney University)
v. State College and University Professional Association (PSEA-
NEA).2° That opinion and its aftermath are the subject of this
comment and the inspiration for its title.2 '
In Cheyney, a probationary employee of Cheyney University was
terminated after he was arrested for speeding and driving without
a license in a University owned vehicle on his way home from a
recruiting trip.2 Upon learning of the arrest, University officials
quickly made a decision to terminate the employee. 3 Thereafter,
the union filed a grievance on behalf of the employee, challenging
the discharge as violative of the progressive discipline features of
the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA").24  Pursuant to the
CBA, the grievance proceeded to arbitration. 5
After the arbitrator determined that he had jurisdiction and
that the issue was arbitrable, the parties offered up differing in-
19. Cheyney, 743 A.2d at 409. "Our court has spoken to this issue on numerous occa-
sions." Id. Though the court named no cases, it is safe to assume they were referring to
seminal Pennsylvania essence test cases such as Cmty. Coll. of Beaver County v. Cmty.
Coll. of Beaver County, Soc'y of the Faculty (PSEA/NEA), 375 A.2d 1267 (Pa. 1977), and
those cited in note 15 infra.
20. 743 A.2d 405 (Pa. 1999).
21. Specifically, the title of this comment stems from the words of Mr. Justice Cappy of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in his majority opinion in Cheyney, 743 A.2d at 407, 409.
Therein Justice Cappy began, "[b]ecause this court has stated different iterations of the
appropriate standard of review, in undertaking this inquiry, we are required to reconsider
the proper role of an appellate court when reviewing a labor arbitration award under the
Pennsylvania Public Employe Relations Act (Act 195)." Id. at 407. Justice Cappy ex-
plained that certain iterations of the essence test have tended to "embolden[] a court to
become a 'superarbitrator' and to vacate an award when it finds that the award is at odds
with how the members of the court would have decided the case." Id. at 413 (emphasis
added). Because such a practice would undermine the judiciary's favor for arbitration, the
court repeated, from past holdings, that "courts must accord great deference to the award
of the arbitrator chosen by the parties." Id. (emphasis and bold added). Hence the title of
this comment.
The 'aftermath" of Cheyney refers to the cases applying or examining the essence test un-
der PERA since the Cheyney decision. A complete list of said cases as of this writing appear
in note 10 infra.





terpretations of a provision of the CBA entitled "Discharge, Demo-
tion, Suspension and Discipline."26 That provision read as follows:
During a professional employees [sic] initial twelve (12)
months of employment, the provisions of this Article shall not
apply. If at any point during a professional employee's initial
probationary period, the President or their [sic] designee(s)
determine that the professional employee will not be retained,
the professional employee will be given 90 days notice prior to
termination, which may include paid or unpaid periods of
time. The parties hereto recognize that for some serious of-
fenses, progressive discipline is inappropriate and immediate
removal may be warranted and such 90 days [sic] notice pe-
riod referred to in this section shall not be applicable.27
The University argued that the first sentence of the above pro-
vision indicated that probationary employees had no right what-
soever to file a grievance challenging their termination.2' Fur-
thermore, the University argued that the same sentence rendered
inapplicable, as to probationary employees, a standard appearing
in a preceding section of the CBA.29 That provision prohibited the
University from taking adverse employment actions without "just
cause."
30
The union, on the other hand, argued that the last sentence of
the above provision implicitly commanded that in most situations,
a probationary employee was entitled to progressive discipline,
and that the effect of the first sentence was merely to deprive pro-
bationary employees of the "just cause" standard.3
In interpreting this ambiguous feature of the contract, the arbi-
trator largely agreed with the union.12 He found that although
probationary employees were not entitled to protection of the "just
cause" standard prior to termination, they were entitled to some
form of progressive discipline in all but the most serious cases."
The arbitrator further inferred that the applicable standard must
be that the University's actions adverse to a probationary em-
26. Id. at 408.
27. Cheyney, 743 A.2d at 408.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 408.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Cheyney, 743 A.2d at 408-09.
33. Id.
584 Vol. 41
The Essence Test Under PERA
ployee must not be "arbitrary and capricious" because he found
some words in another section of the CBA providing that "some
minimum procedural due process standard applies."34 In his final
award, the arbitrator sustained the grievance, finding that the
employee was at minimum entitled to an investigation and a
statement of reasons for his termination.35 Because the employee
was terminated before there was any verification of his arrest or
the status of his driver's license, the arbitrator found that the pro-
bationary employee was terminated in a fashion impermissible
under the CBA.36 The arbitrator ordered his reinstatement with
back pay.37
The University did not comply with the award and instead filed
a petition for review with the Commonwealth Court of Pennsyl-
vania." The Commonwealth Court reversed the arbitrator's
award, finding that the plain meaning of the first sentence of the
"Discharge, Demotion, Suspension and Discipline" provision pre-
cluded arbitration of probationary employee grievances and that
the arbitrator impermissibly imposed an "arbitrary and capri-
cious" standard that did not appear in the agreement.39 Thereaf-
ter, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the union's petition
for further review.4"
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court began its review of the case
by noting that it had "spoken to this issue on numerous occa-
sions.""1 However, the court explained, "based upon the number of
challenges to arbitration awards, [the] court's standard of review
has seemingly become a boilerplate standard lacking in real mean-
ing or practical application."42 The court continued:
Moreover, the court has stated different variations of the ap-
plicable standard which has led to a less than uniform proc-
lamation of the appropriate degree of deference that a review-
ing court should accord to a labor arbitrator's decision. Thus,
34. Id. at 408
35. Id. at 408-09.
36. Id. at 409.





42. Cheyney, 743 A.2d at 409.
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we will revisit the appropriate role of a court to play in re-
viewing a labor arbitration award under [PERAI.43
The court then went through a fairly detailed analysis of the
history of the "essence test," including its roots in the United
States Supreme Court's Steelworkers Trilogy.44 The court stated:
It is axiomatic that the arbitration of labor disputes is highly
valued and greatly favored in our Commonwealth. Arbitra-
tion is swifter, less formal, and less expensive than traditional
dispute resolution by courts. Arbitration has been described
as more responsive to individual needs and preferential in
light of the ongoing relationship between employer and union.
Perhaps most importantly, arbitration has been seen as a
prime force in the policy of reducing industrial strife . . .
While in the context of labor relations, the final and binding
arbitration of grievances is greatly favored, arbitration
awards are not inviolate. On rare occasions, appellate courts
are required to review an arbitrator's award ... While the phi-
losophy of judicial restraint was made clear in the court's ini-
tial expression of the essence test, the concept of the essence
test has not been defined with complete consistency in subse-
quent cases by this court. Indeed, what exactly the essence
test means, and the concomitant extent of judicial review, has
proved to be a nettlesome question.45
The court then underwent a brief review of some of the varying
interpretations.46
In the end, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the
Commonwealth Court erred in reversing the holdings of the arbi-
trator.47 Although the court did not necessarily agree with the ar-
bitrator's decision, it found itself bound by the essence test to re-
spect the arbitrator's interpretation as it was rationally derived
from the CBA.45 In doing so, however, the court set forth and ap-
plied a new, more specific iteration of the essence test, to help
guide lower courts in future applications and to avoid further dis-
43. Id.
44. Id. at 410-13. See supra notes 4 and 5.
45. Id. at 409-11.
46. Id. at 411-13. The court described the "extreme deference" cases and the less defer-
ential "manifestly unreasonable" cases. Id.
47. Cheyney, 743 A.2d at 416-17.
48. Id. at 416.
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tortion of the test's language.49 From thence forward, the court
held, Pennsylvania courts reviewing labor arbitration awards
must conduct a two-prong analysis. ° First, the courts must de-
termine if the issue as properly defined is within the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement.5 Second, if the issue is in fact
embraced by the agreement, and thus, appropriately before the
arbitrator (i.e., prong one is satisfied), the arbitrator's award must
be upheld if the arbitrator's interpretation can be rationally de-
rived from the collective bargaining agreement.52 In other words,
a court should only vacate an arbitrator's award "where the award
indisputably and genuinely is without foundation in, or fails to
logically flow from, the collective bargaining agreement."53 Fur-
thermore, the court expressly disavowed use of the words "reason-
able" and "manifestly unreasonable" in connection with the es-
sence test. 4 They found that such language has a tendency to in-
vite a substitution of viewpoint."5 In the future, the court com-
manded, only the "rationally derived" language would be accept-
able.
As mentioned briefly above, the purpose of this comment is to
review the application of the essence test under PERA by Penn-
sylvania's various courts since the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
provided the above-described instructions in Cheyney. Primarily,
this comment seeks to answer, albeit at an early stage, whether
that opinion and its new clarified expression of the essence test
has corrected the course of the doctrine in Pennsylvania, as the
court intended it too, or whether its path remains skewed, all the
while undermining the policy of favoring arbitration in public la-
bor relations. What follows is an analysis of the relevant PERA
case law since Cheyney, organized by court and chronology.
II. PENNSYLVANIA COMMONWEALTH COURT
Perhaps the Pennsylvania court which applies the essence test
on the most frequent basis is the Commonwealth Court. Many
PERA arbitration appeals find their way to, and end their life cy-
49. Id. at 413.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Cheyney, 743 A.2d at 413.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 413 n.8.
55. Id.
Spring 2003 587
588 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 41
cle, in this courtroom." Therefore, to determine whether the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's instructions in Cheyney are thus
far being carried out, an examination of the Commonwealth
Court's most recent, post-Cheyney reviews of labor arbitration
awards is necessary.
Abington School District v. Abington School Service Personnel As-
sociation /AFSCME57
The first post-Cheyney Commonwealth Court opinion to apply
the essence test to a labor arbitration award was Abington School
District v. Abington School Service Personnel Associa-
tion /AFSCME." There, an individual employed by the school dis-
trict as a painter failed to follow standard procedure in using pro-
tective masking during a certain job.59 As a result, the paint over-
spray settled on many vehicles in the school parking lot.6" Because
of his carelessness, the employee was demoted from group leader
to regular painter and suspended for five days.6'
The painter's bargaining unit filed a grievance contesting the
disciplinary action." The union argued that the CBA established
a "progressive discipline procedure" which was violated by the dis-
56. The frequency of PERA appeals heard by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
can be attributed to 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 761 and 762. In relevant part, those statutes
provide:
§ 761. Original jurisdiction
(a) General Rule. -- The Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions or proceedings:
(1) Against the Commonwealth government, including any officer thereof, acting in
his official capacity ... [and/or] ...
(2) By the Commonwealth government, including any officer thereof, acting in his of-
ficial capacity ...
§ 762. Appeals from court of common pleas
(a) General Rule. -- Except as provided in subsection (b), the Commonwealth Court
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of the courts of common
pleas in the following cases:
(1) Commonwealth civil cases. -- All civil actions or proceedings:
(i) Original jurisdiction of which is vested in another tribunal by virtue of any of the
exceptions to section 761(a)(1) (relating to original jurisdiction), ...
(ii) By the Commonwealth government, including any officer thereof acting in his of-
ficial capacity...
Id.
57. 744 A.2d 367 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).
58. Abington, 744 A.2d at 367.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 368.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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trict's action.63 The district, on the other hand, argued under a
conflicting provision that "maintenance of discipline" was a matter
reserved solely to the district.64 In construing the ambiguity, the
arbitrator sided with the union, finding that the CBA mandated a
progressive discipline system except as to the most serious of-
fenses, that the painter was merely careless, and had not been the
subject of prior discipline, and therefore the demotion and suspen-
sion was too severe a punishment and in violation of the CBA.65
The district appealed but the Court of Common Pleas of Mont-
gomery County affirmed the arbitrator's award.66 The district ap-
pealed again to the Commonwealth Court.67
The Commonwealth Court also affirmed the arbitrator's find-
ings, correctly identifying the essence test as the governing stan-
dard of review." At the outset, though failing to note the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court's recent Cheyney instructions on the stan-
dard, the Commonwealth Court commented that "[a]n arbitrator
generally has the power, and specifically under this Agreement, to
interpret its provisions ... and we will not reverse unless the in-
terpretation of the agreement fails to draw itself from the essence
63. Abington, 744 A.2d at 368. Article XII, Section 1 of the Collective bargaining
agreement between the parties provided:
With the exception of serious offenses which call for immediate discharge, it is the
School District's intention to follow the theory of progressive discipline. Because of-
fenses vary in seriousness, it is impractical to detail with particularity the exact na-
ture of the progressive discipline. Most minor infractions shall first be handled with
oral warnings and counseling. If an employee's behavior persists, then a written
warning or warnings may follow prior to an employee being suspended.
Id.
64. Id. at 369. Article I, Section 2 of the governing CBA provided:
The Union recognizes the right of the Board to manage the affairs of the School dis-
trict and to direct its working force. Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement,
nothing shall be deemed to limit the Board in any way in the exercise of the custom-
ary functions of management, including the right to determine such areas of discre-
tion or policy as the functions and programs of the School District, its standards of
services, its overall budget, the utilization of technology, the organizational structure,
the selection of personnel and the maintenance of discipline, order and efficiency in
the School District. The Board shall have the right to publish reasonable rules and
regulations from time to time that it may consider necessary and roper for the con-
duct of its business, provided the same are not inconsistent with the terms of this
Agreement.
Id.
65. Id. at 368.
66. Id. The court of common pleas held that "the Agreement neither defined progres-
sive discipline nor precluded an arbitrator from modifying the initial discipline that the
District imposed." Id.
67. Id.
68. Abington, 744 A.2d at 368 n..
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of the agreement."69 The court went on to correctly recognize that
while the arbitrator did not make the only possible, nor necessar-
ily correct interpretation of the CBA, he nonetheless made a ra-
tional interpretation of the relevant CBA provisions, and his
award, therefore, had to be upheld.7"
Despite the fact that in Abington the Commonwealth Court did
not apply the newly reformulated two-prong essence test as just
recently enunciated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, they did
in fact do it justice and assumed their proper role of deference.
The fact that Cheyney was not even cited is perhaps a reflection of
the fact that the Cheyney opinion may have been too new for the
court to have been aware of it. Most likely, Cheyney had not yet
been published. Further indication of their ignorance regarding
the reformulation of the test can be found in their closing state-
ments that quote some of the language expressly repudiated in
Cheyney.71 While the Commonwealth Court should be recognized
for having, for the most part, appropriately applied the essence
test in Abington, the case does not provide an adequate canvass
for evaluation of Cheyney's effect, as the court did not acknowledge
its existence.
York County Transportation Authority v. Teamsters Local Union
#43072
In York, the Commonwealth Court's second application of the
essence test under PERA post-Cheyney, a bus driver was termi-
nated pursuant to the progressive disciplinary section of a CBA
providing that a sixth "miss-out" subjected an employee to possible
discharge. 73 The union filed a grievance contesting the termina-
tion as lacking in "just cause" as was required by another section
of the CBA.74 The grievance proceeded to arbitration where the
arbitrator found that although the grievant had in fact accumu-
69. Id. at 369.
70. Id. at 371.
71. Id. at 370. The court made reference to some of the language expressly repudiated
by Justice Cappy in Cheyney: "[Aln arbitrator's decision can be reversed when the penalty
based on 'found facts' is 'manifestly unreasonable . . . .'" Id. (citing Crawford County v.
AFSCME Dist. Council 85, 693 A.2d 1385, 1389 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997)). One might be
able to assume that had the court been aware of Cheyney's holdings, it would not have
made this poor choice of words. In any event, their use didn't seem to affect the analysis or
ultimate holdings.
72. 746 A.2d 1208 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).
73. York, 746 A.2d at 1210.
74. Id. at 1210-11.
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lated a number of "miss-outs" according to that term's definition
under the CBA, there were extenuating circumstances for a num-
ber of these "miss-outs" which the employer did not contest.
7
Therefore, the arbitrator found that discharge was too severe a
penalty, not for "just cause," and modified the discipline to sus-
pension.76
The employer's initial appeal was denied by the trial court.77
The Transportation Authority appealed a second time to the
Commonwealth Court.8
The Commonwealth Court in York, unlike in Abington, ex-
pressly recognized the newly set-forth Cheyney version of the es-
sence test and proceeded accordingly.79 They found the first prong
of the Cheyney test to be satisfied without dispute, and therefore
proceeded to examine whether the arbitrator's decision was ra-
tionally derived from the CBA. ° The court then examined each
side's argument but was forced to recognize that it did not have
the authority to vacate in this situation.8 This realization was
reflected in the court's statement that:
[e]ven if we agreed with [the employer's] contention that the
Arbitrator misinterpreted this CBA provision, we lack the au-
thority to overturn the Arbitrator's decision based upon [the
employers's] alternative contract interpretation . . . [w]here,
as rationally interpreted by the Arbitrator here, the CBA does
not reserve to select discipline exclusively to the employer.82
York is the first truly post-Cheyney application of the essence
test by the Commonwealth Court, as it was the first recognition of
that case's holdings. Therefore, it is also the first case where
75. Id. at 1212. Under the CBA, "Miss-outs" were defined as follows:"A miss out occurs
anytime an operator fails to report for an assignment at the proper time and place, does not
report for work, or calls off sick less than one hour before scheduled to report."
Id. at 1211.
76. Id. at 1212.
77. Id.
78. York, 746 A.2d at 1212.
79. Id. at 1213. The Commonwealth Court noted:
Very recently, in [Cheyney], our supreme court observed an inconsistency in the
Pennsylvania courts' application of the standard of review to be employed in these in-
stances, noting that courts have applied varying degrees of judicial deference to an
arbitrator's award. The supreme court thus deemed it prudent to restate the analy-
sis to be applied under the essence test.
Id.
80. Id. at 1214.
81. Id. at 1214-19.
82. Id. at 1218.
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meaningful analysis of Cheyney's effect can begin. It appears that
the Commonwealth Court correctly enunciated and applied the
Cheyney essence test in York. They stuck closely to its language
and rationale. The arbitrator's only task was to interpret the am-
biguous term "just cause," and he did not exceed his charge.83 The
court affirmed the arbitrator's award because it was rationally
derived from the collective bargaining agreement, despite the fact
that they may have interpreted it differently.84 Thus, in its first
true application of the Cheyney essence test, it appeared that the
Commonwealth Court heeded the Supreme Court's instructions.
Rochester Area School District v. Rochester Education Association,
PSEA INEA
85
In Rochester, a dispute arose when the school district unilater-
ally raised students' honor roll requirements by one-fourth of a
point.88 In response, the teachers' union filed a grievance contend-
ing that the governing CBA required joint-development of such
policies and that the district, therefore, was in violation for not
consulting with them.87 The school board, on the other hand,
maintained that such policy changes related strictly to their
managerial powers and prerogatives and that the CBA placed no
obligation on them to secure pre-approval by the teachers' union."
To the contrary, the school district contended that the CBA ex-
pressly allowed them to act in such a fashion.89
When the dispute proceeded to arbitration, the arbitrator found
in favor of the union because the clear, concise and unambiguous
language of the CBA required joint-development of such policies. °
The arbitrator ordered the school district to rescind the policy un-
til it could be mutually developed.9' Soon thereafter, the district
filed an appeal contending that the arbitrator's award did not
83. York, 746 A.2d at 1219. The court reflected on the fact that "the Arbitrator was free
to do as he did here, namely, determine that Grievant's poor work record, illustrated by his
six miss-outs, warranted discipline, but then go on to determine that Grievant's conduct did
not amount to just cause for termination within the meaning of the CBA." Id.
84. Id. at 1218-19.
85. 747 A.2d 971 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).




90. Id. at 972-73.
91. Rochester, 747 A.2d at 973.
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draw its essence from the CBA.92 The trial court agreed with the
district and vacated the arbitrator's award, finding that there was
no "rational way in which [the CBA] could be interpreted to re-
quire the consent of the [Union] as to all policies prior to adoption
by the School Board."9" The union appealed to the Commonwealth
Court.
94
The Commonwealth Court began its analysis by recognizing its
role of deference in reviewing arbitration awards under the es-
sence test.95 Again, they specifically paused and reflected on the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's recent instructions in Cheyney.
96
Nevertheless, the court proceeded to affirm the lower court's vaca-
tion of the arbitrator's award.97 They found that the arbitrator's
award did not draw its essence from the agreement because, de-
spite the CBA language affirming the district's obligation to
jointly-develop such policies, "a common thread running through
the pertinent provisions of the CBA is the recognition that the
School Board retains its exclusive right to initiate and adopt such
management policies."98
Without more details regarding the CBA provisions, it is diffi-
cult to say whether or not the court was correct in its conclusion
that the trial court did not act "outside its authority under the 'es-
sence test' by substituting its own interpretation of the CBA for
the rational interpretation offered by the Arbitrator" here.9 9 On
the one hand, the court did purportedly and repeatedly recognize
their role of deference under Cheyney and applied the appropriate
"rational" language. But on the other hand, the court's analysis
did not stick closely to the detailed two-prong test from Cheyney.
In fact, the court did little more than mention it.'00
It seems to this author, at least from the court's recitation of the
facts of the case, that there may well have been rational support
for the arbitrator's position there. The CBA did contain an explicit
provision providing that there was to be joint development of such
92. Id.
93. Id. (citing Trial ct. op. At 7, R.R. at 64a).
94. Id. at 973.
95. Id.
96. Rochester, 747 A.2d at 973.
97. Id. at 977.
98. Id. at 974.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 973.
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policies.'0 ' It is true that the Commonwealth Court made assur-
ance that:
[T]his is not a case where the court has intruded into the do-
main of the Arbitrator by substituting its own interpretation
of the CBA for the rational interpretation offered by the Arbi-
trator. Rather, here, the Arbitrator has ignored and rendered
meaningless [some relevant portions] of the CBA, which . . .
expressly preserve and protect the School Board's right to de-
velop and adopt management policies for the District without
the [Union's] participation or consent. °2
However, it might just as easily be said that the Commonwealth
Court rendered meaningless that portion of the CBA that the arbi-
trator cited in rational support of his award. It is difficult to say
that an arbitrator's decision was not rational and did not "draw its
essence" from a CBA which contained a provision stating exactly
what his award stated. For this reason, Rochester might be the
first case since Cheyney where the Commonwealth Court went
awry in its application of the essence test. The court may have
once again succumbed to the desire to overrule an interpretation
that they strongly disagreed with, despite its rational derivation
from the CBA.
Penn-Delco School District v. Penn-Delco Education Association'°
In Penn-Delco, a CBA between a teachers' union and their em-
ployer school district contained a provision, which provided that
"all extra pay positions will first be offered to bargaining unit
members."' °4 In one instance, when one of these "extra-pay" posi-
tions, specifically that of head football coach, became vacant, a
unit member promptly applied, but the district nevertheless hired
outside of the unit.' The union contested the action as contrary
to the CBA and filed a grievance."' The matter eventually pro-
ceeded to arbitration where the district argued that the matter
was not arbitrable because this particular position was a "non-
professional" position specifically excluded from the grievance pro-
101. Rochester, 747 A.2d at 972.
102. Id. at 977.
103. 754 A.2d 51 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000)
104. Penn-Delco, 754 A.2d at 52 (citing Article 10, paragraph 8 of the CBA).
105. Penn-Delco, 754 A.2d at 52.
106. Id.
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cedure under a provision of the CBA. °7 The arbitrator concluded
from these conflicting provisions, that although the language of
the CBA did not provide access to the grievance procedure for is-
sues over posted "non-professional" positions, that provision did
not apply to such positions when the applicant was a professional
employee, and found for the union. The arbitrator concluded
that any matter which "immediately affected" a person that did
fall within the CBA's definition of "employee" (and, therefore, its
coverage), regardless of whether the position being applied for was
"non-professional," was arbitrable."5
The district filed a petition to vacate, claiming that according to
the clear language of the CBA, the arbitrator did not have juris-
diction to arbitrate the issue."' The trial court denied the dis-
trict's position that any dispute regarding a supplemental "non-
professional" position applied for by an existing professional em-
ployee was not arbitrable under the CBA."' The trial court found
that the CBA provisions at issue were ambiguous and conflicting,
and that the arbitrator's construction of them could be rationally
derived therefrom.' Still unhappy with the rulings, the district
appealed again to the Commonwealth Court."'
The Commonwealth Court also sustained the arbitrator's
award." ' Although the court failed to mention specifically the
holdings of Cheyney, it was obvious that the court was conscious of
its holdings as it correctly stated and applied the two-prong es-
107. Id. According to the court, Article 2, Recognition, of the CBA provided:
The Board hereby recognizes the Association as the exclusive bargaining agent for
those employees included in the Unit as certified by the PLRB pursuant to PERA.
The term "Employee" will include and apply to all Long Term Substitute Teachers /
Temporary Professional Employees / Professional Employees whose appointment is
for at least one semester (90 or more days) and whose daily service is 3-3/4 hours or
more per day or equivalent hours per week (18.75 hours). The Unit will not include
per diem substitute teachers, coordinators, psychologists, first level supervisors, ad-
ministrators, non-professional employees, and confidential employees as defined in
PERA.
Penn-Delco, 754 A.2d at 53 n.1.
108. Penn-Delco, 754 A.2d at 53. To aid in his construction of the conflicting provisions,
the arbitrator also appeared to have consulted a provision of the CBA obligating the parties
to jointly address alleged grievances and seek "equitable solutions," insofar as he felt the
purpose of the provision would be frustrated if the instant matter were not deemed arbitra-
ble. Id. at 53, citing Article 7 of the CBA.
109. Id. at 53.
110. Id. at 53-54.
111. Id. at 54.
112. Id.
113. Penn-Delco, 754 A.2d at 54.
114. Id. at 59.
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sence test as it was defined therein. First, the court noted that
"[t]he essence test requires a determination as to whether the
terms of the agreement encompass the subject matter of the dis-
pute.""' Having found prong one satisfied, the court continued on
to the second prong, noting that "[w]here it is determined that the
subject matter of the dispute is encompassed within the terms of
the agreement, the validity of the arbitrator's interpretation is not
a matter of concern to the court."".6 Finally, the court concluded
that "the arbitrator's determination, that the grievance is proce-
durally arbitrable, drew its essence from the CBA" because in the
face of this ambiguous issue, the arbitrator made a rational inter-
pretation largely on the basis of a particular provision of the CBA
setting forth that the purpose of the grievance procedure was to
secure "equitable solutions to alleged grievances concerning the
interpretation or application of any provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement.""7 Because the arbitrator determined that
the purpose of this provision would be frustrated if the issue at
hand were not subject to the grievance procedure, the court had to
admit that the award was rationally derived and therefore upheld
it. 11
8
As mentioned above, although the Penn-Delco court never made
reference to Cheyney and its revised two-prong essence test, it is
safe to assume that it was nonetheless appropriately applied and
adhered to. The court first determined that the issue was within
the CBA and then utilized the appropriate language and frame-
work in reaching its decision to uphold the arbitrator's award.
The language of the CBA in this case clearly allowed for the arbi-
trator's interpretation, and the Commonwealth Court recognized
the same, despite their potential for disagreement with the logic.
Blue Mountain School District v. Soister 9
In Blue Mountain, a school secretary was terminated following
three incidents of using her position in an inappropriate manner,
115. Id. at 54 (citing Cranberry Area Sch. Dist. v. Cranberry Educ. Ass'n, 713 A.2d 726,
729 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998) (quoting Leechburg Area Sch. Dist. v. Dale, 424 A.2d 1309,
1312-13 (Pa. 1981))).
116. Id. at 54 (citing Cranberry Area Sch. Dist. v. Cranberry Educ. Ass'n, 713 A.2d 726,
729 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998) (quoting Leechburg Area Sch. Dist. v. Dale, 424 A.2d 1309,
1312-13 (Pa. 1981))).
117. Penn-Delco, 754 A.2d at 55. See supra note 108.
118. Penn-Delco, 754 A.2d at 59.
119. 758 A.2d 742 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).
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and one unfavorable job review. 120 The union filed a grievance on
the secretary's behalf objecting to the termination as contrary to
the CBA.12 1 The dispute culminated in arbitration.
1 2
At arbitration, the union contended that the CBA provided that
all terminations had to be for "just cause."23 The school district
argued that under the CBA, a dismissal must always be upheld
when the terminated employee's conduct violated the school code
and policies.'24
The arbitrator, after a hearing on the issues, resolved the ambi-
guity in favor of the union, finding that "just cause" was in fact the
applicable standard, and that the secretary's dismissal was not for
"just cause" as that term was intended under the CBA.l'2 The ar-
bitrator thereby modified the secretary's penalty to suspension."'
The school district appealed to common pleas court, contending
that the arbitrator's decision was not encompassed by the essence
of the CBA and that he did not have the authority thereunder to
modify the discipline."7 In opposition, the union argued that be-
cause the arbitrator found a lack of just cause, the CBA allowed
him to adjust the penalty.' In its analysis of these arguments,
the trial court employed the old, erroneous "manifestly unreason-
able" language that had been mixed into the essence test over the
years and that was specifically condemned by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Cheyney.12' The court of common pleas reversed
the arbitrator's award. 3°
The union, on behalf of the grievant, appealed to the Common-
wealth Court contending that the trial court erred in setting aside
the arbitrator's award contrary to the essence test.' In a very
good opinion, perhaps its best yet, the Commonwealth Court de-
scribed the recent pronouncements of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Cheyney and recognized the trial court's error, particu-





125. Blue Mountain, 758 A.2d at 743-44.








larly in their use of the condemned "manifestly unreasonable"
language, to reverse the arbitrator's decision."2
This particular Commonwealth Court opinion and application of
the essence test was near flawless, and is an excellent example of
proper essence test application. Much like in York, the arbitrator
did no more than that which was his charge. He merely inter-
preted the ambiguous provisions of the CBA in an undeniably ra-
tional manner. Specifically, the arbitrator construed the term
"just cause." There is no authority under the essence test to re-
verse in such an instance. The Commonwealth Court gave clear
indications that the Supreme Court's message in Cheyney was
heard and understood. The court's clarity is reflected in their con-
cluding statements:
Although the trial court disagreed with the Arbitrator's con-
clusion of the severity of the improper conduct and we may
agree with the trial court, because it is not irrational, we
must give deference to the Arbitrator's finding that there was
no just cause mandating Grievant's dismissal, only for disci-
pline less than termination. The Arbitrator's setting aside
the termination was not irrational and must be upheld.'
Greater Nanticoke Area School District v. Greater Nanticoke Area
Education Association'
In Greater-Nanticoke, a dispute arose when a school district
demoted ten of its teachers from full-time to part-time status.1
The teachers' union filed a grievance contending that these demo-
tions were in violation of a "no-furlough" clause in their CBA.'36 In
relevant part, the pertinent CBA provision provided that "[i]t is
agreed between the parties that in recognition of the salary modi-
fications, the [school district] shall not involuntarily furlough any
current bargaining unit member during the term of the modified
agreement."'37 The school district argued that "this prohibition
132. Id. at 744-45. The court noted that "our Supreme Court, albeit in dicta, 'reiterated
that the essence test does not permit an appellate court to intrude into the domain of the
arbitrator and determine whether an award is 'manifestly unreasonable"." Id. at 745 (cit-
ing Pennsylvania Game Comm'n v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n (Toth), 747 A.2d 887, 891 n.7
(Pa. 2000)).
133. Blue Mountain, 758 A.2d at 745.
134. 760 A.2d 1214 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).
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against involuntary furlough had no bearing on reductions in
status from full to part-time."138 The union, in opposition, argued
that "the term 'furlough' encompassed any action adversely affect-
ing employment status, including a demotion to part-time."39
The dispute proceeded to arbitration according to the terms of
the CBA.4 ° There, the arbitrator found the term "furlough" to be
ambiguous as used in the CBA.'4' Based on the evidence pre-
sented, he found that the term did in fact encompass the demo-
tions at hand and thereby sustained the union's grievance.'
The school district appealed to the court of common pleas, which
refused to vacate the award. 4 3 The district appealed again to the
Commonwealth Court.
44
In another meritorious opinion, the Commonwealth Court af-
firmed the trial court and upheld the arbitrator's award.'45 The
court again expressly recognized its reviewing limitations and
their recent delineation in Cheyney.'46 Thereafter, they properly
applied the two prongs of the essence test. 141 The court demon-
strated clear understanding of the doctrine in their statement
that, "based as it is upon concepts as slippery as 'rationally de-
rived' and 'logically flowing from,' the essence test standard has
been susceptible to interpretational drift." 48 Further, the court
noted:
[T]he court in Cheyney University rejected both what it char-
acterized as the "extreme deference" standard under which
"as long as the issue is covered by the agreement, the inquiry
is at an end" and "language used by our court indicating a
standard of review looking to the 'reasonableness' of the arbi-
trator's award" . . . [and] reaffirmed the "rationally derived"
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Greater Nanticoke, 760 A.2d at 1215.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1215-16.
144. Id. at 1216.
145. Greater Nanticoke, 760 A.2d at 1221.
146. Id. at 1216. In reviewing Cheyney, the Commonwealth Court noted "that the es-
sence test has long been established as the appropriate standard of review of an Act 195
[PERA] arbitrator's interpretation of a CBA. However, based as it is upon concepts as
slippery as 'rationally derived' and 'logically flowing from,' the essence test has been sus-
ceptible to interpretational drift." Id.
147. Id. at 1217-21.
148. Id. at 1216.
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standard . . . [as originally articulated by the United States
and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts].149
After careful analysis, the Commonwealth Court concluded that,
"there seems little question that the arbitrator's conclusion as to
the parties' intent is rationally derived from the CBA viewed in
light of its language, its context, and the surrounding circum-
stances."5 ' The court upheld the arbitrator's award."'
Greater Nanticoke is another excellent application of the essence
test, akin to those in Blue Mountain and York, where the arbitra-
tor did no more than rationally interpret conflicting terms of a
CBA. As mentioned in the analyses of those cases above, there is
no room for a court's substitution of judgment in these cases under
the essence test. Little additional analysis is necessary.
Greene County v. District 2, United Mine Workers of America 5'
The case of Greene County found itself before the Common-
wealth Court on a remand for reconsideration based specifically on
the holdings of Cheyney."' The Commonwealth Court had origi-
nally found the arbitrator's award to be "manifestly unreasonable"
under the essence test, drawing that language from the cases the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court repudiated in Cheyney."4
The facts of Greene County were as follows. A children and
youth services caseworker had been suspended and discharged for
failing to maintain organized case files and a host of preceding
policy violations, for which progressive discipline techniques were
employed.155 The union filed a grievance concerning the discharge
and the dispute found its way to arbitration pursuant to the terms
of the CBA.' Finding mitigating factors, the arbitrator modified
the caseworker's penalty to suspension only."7
The employer appealed to the court of common pleas, which
found for the employer on a motion for summary judgment, rein-
149. Id. at 1216-17 (citing Leechburg, 424 A.2d 1309 (1981) and Cheyney, 743 A.2d 405
(1999)).
150. Greater Nanticoke, 760 A.2d at 1221.
151. Id.
152. 778 A.2d 1259 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001).
153. Greene County, 778 A.2d at 1260. The original opinion is found at 736 A.2d 52 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1999), vacated and remanded at 761 A.2d 1180 (Pa. 2000).
154. Id. at 1260.
155. Id. at 1260-61.
156. Id. at 1261.
157. Id.
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stating the discharge.' The common pleas court found that main-
taining case files was so important that the arbitrator's sentence
modification was "manifestly unreasonable" in that it even consid-
ered mitigating factors.159
The union appealed to the Commonwealth Court, contending
that the arbitrator's decision must be upheld because it drew its
essence from the CBA. 6° It argued that in the absence of language
limiting the arbitrator's authority, it was rational for him to con-
clude that he had the authority to modify disciplinary actions, and
therefore the reviewing court had no authority to overturn. 6'
Originally, as noted above, the Commonwealth Court had dis-
agreed with the union's position, but when the case was remanded
for reconsideration in light of Cheyney, the Commonwealth Court
seized the opportunity to correct its rather obvious error. Under
the clear language of the CBA, the employer was not to discharge
an employee without "just cause."'62 The lack of a definition for
the term "just cause" created an ambiguity in the CBA.' The
Commonwealth Court proceeded to defer to the arbitrator's ra-
tional construction of the term and upheld his award.
6 4
Clearly, it was rational for the arbitrator to conclude that he
could evaluate "just cause," as it was an undefined term within
the CBA, and his construction of the term was as rational as any.
The Court realized as much in reversing its own prior position in
the case:
[R]ecently, the Supreme Court in Cheyney University criti-
cized Philadelphia Housing Authority, Independent State




162. Greene County, 778 A.2d at 1262. Article XIX, Section 9 of the governing CBA
stated, in relevant part that "The County shall not demote, suspend, discharge, extend a
probationary period or take any disciplinary action against an Employee without just
cause." Id. Rounding out the ambiguity, Article V of the CBA provided:
The County has the exclusive right and power to manage, control and conduct its
business, to plan and direct the working forces, including the right to hire, promote,
schedule or transfer its Employees, or to suspend, discharge or demote its Employees
for just cause and to make rules relating to operations as it deems advisable, subject,
however, to the provisions of this Agreement and except as limited by law.
Id.
163. Id. at 1262. The court noted that "[tihe CBA does not define "just cause," and
where such is the case, "the arbitrator may give meaning to the phrase." Id. (citing Sch.
Dist. of Springfield Township v. Springfield Township Support Personnel Ass'n, 711 A.2d
602 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998)).
164. Greene County, 778 A.2d at 1264.
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Stores, and Musser (and Crawford County by extension) for
applying variations of the essence test in reviewing the arbi-
trator's decision and presumably has retreated from its prior
stance limiting an arbitrator's authority to overturn the disci-
pline meted out by public employers against employees who
threaten their ability to perform their public duty.'65
The court continued:
Because the issue in this case, whether [the employer] had
just cause to discharge [the caseworker,] falls within the
terms of the CBA, and because the arbitrator's interpretation
of just cause as its application in this case can rationally be
derived from the terms of the agreement, affirmance of the
trial court is not warranted even though we believe that the
arbitrator's decision, though rational, is incorrect.'
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court could not have stated it any
better and would likely approve of this holding.
United School District v. United Education Association67
In United, there was some ambiguity in the terms of a renegoti-
ated portion of the controlling CBA in that it provided for both a
new negotiated early retirement incentive and a previously exist-
ing entitlement where retiring employees were to receive compen-
sation for accumulated unused sick-leave days.'68 The CBA was
unclear, however, regarding whether a retiree could receive both
the new and old benefit.6 ' The ambiguity became apparent when
a number of retiring teachers were denied one or the other.7 ° A
dispute arose and proceeded to arbitration with the district claim-
ing, based on evidence of past practice, some bargaining notes,
and the testimony of an expert, that the correct interpretation of
the ambiguous CBA provisions was that an early retiree was only
entitled to one of the retirement benefits or the other. 7' The union
165. Id. at 1263-64.
166. Id. at 1264.
167. 782 A.2d 40 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001).
168. United, 782 A.2d at 42.
169. Id. at 42-43.
170. Id. at 42.
171. Id. at 43.
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argued instead for an interpretation that an early retiree was en-
titled to both.1 12 After receiving all relevant evidence, the arbitra-
tor sided with the union.
3
The district appealed to the court of common pleas. 74 The com-
mon pleas court refused to vacate as it was of the opinion that the
arbitrator merely interpreted an ambiguous term of the CBA and
did so in a rational way.7 5
On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the school district again
argued that the arbitrator's award did not draw its essence from
the CBA."' However, the Commonwealth Court held that it was
bound by the state supreme court's recent Cheyney opinion to re-
spect the arbitrator's interpretation in such a situation.7 7 The
court proceeded in an accurate Cheyney essence test analysis and
determined that "[a]pplying this standard, although we might dis-
agree with the award, or even find it to be manifestly unreason-
able in light of the fact that the arbitrator's negotiating history
and the parties' thirteen-year custom and practice thereafter, we
cannot say that it is irrational." 78 Therefore, the court concluded,
it was "constrained to affirm the order of the court of common
pleas." 79 Again, both prong's were clearly satisfied, and it would
be difficult to argue against the result arrived at by the Common-
wealth Court in United.
Apollo-Ridge School District v. Apollo-Ridge Education Associa-
tion 8°
In Apollo-Ridge, the Commonwealth Court may have begun to
go a bit awry of the essence test, similar to the way it did in Roch-
ester. Although the court correctly identified the standard and
gave a nod to Cheyney, the court proceeded to overturn a seem-
ingly rational decision by the arbitrator. As discussed below, the
dissent effectively argued this point.
In Apollo-Ridge, each year, the school board selected persons to
lead various extra-curricular programs offered to the district's
172. Id.
173. United, 782 A.2d at 43.
174. Id. at 44.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 45-6.
178. United, 782 A.2d at 48.
179. Id.
180. 799 A.2d 911 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
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students."' In years past, the board had always appointed those
persons recommended by the high-school principal.'82 For the
1999-2000 school year, however, the principal made suggestions as
usual but the board appointed some individuals from outside of
the bargaining unit."'l The district denied that the assignment of
extra-work duties was covered by the CBA and contended that any
grievances on that subject, therefore, were not arbitrable.14 The
dispute led to arbitration.85
At the arbitration, the arbitrator determined that the dispute
was in fact arbitrable because, despite the fact that the assign-
ment of extra-work positions was not a topic specifically covered
by the CBA, past practice had given rise to a local working condi-
tion protected by the CBA."8' Therefore, the arbitrator held, the
district was obligated to assign those recommended by the princi-
pal.'87 Plus, the arbitrator noted, the CBA did contain a provision
listing all the extra-duty assignments and their salaries, and could
in that regard be considered "covered" by the CBA, and thus, arbi-
trable.'88 The arbitrator sustained the union's grievance and
awarded back pay to those denied the extra-duty positions.'89 The
"arbitrator concluded . . . that the grievances were arbitrable be-
cause, even though the CBA does not describe precisely how extra-
duty assignments are to be made, it does include an extensive list
of extra-duty assignments and their salaries."9 °
The district appealed to the court of common pleas, maintaining
its contention that the dispute was not arbitrable. '  The trial
court rejected the district's claim, finding that the arbitrator's
award appropriately drew its essence from the CBA."9' The dis-
trict appealed to the Commonwealth Court.'9'
A majority of the Commonwealth Court affirmed the arbitrator's
determination that the dispute was arbitrable according to the





186. Apollo-Ridge, 799 A.2d at 912.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 913.
189. Id. at 912.
190. Id. at 913.
191. Apollo-Ridge, 799 A.2d at 912.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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first prong of the Cheyney test.' They found that the issue was
covered by the CBA in that it did mention (list) the extra-duty as-
signments and their salaries.9 However, turning to the second
prong of the test, the court found that the arbitrator's determina-
tion that the past practice rose to the level of a local working con-
dition enforceable under the CBA was not rationally derived from
the CBA.'96 The court expressed that they "cannot say that such a
transfer of power was ever envisioned in, let alone rationally de-
rived from, the CBA."'97
It is difficult to agree with the court's application of the essence
test in Apollo-Ridge. The dissent in this case contained the more
convincing argument. Judge Friedman argued that:
Given the deferential standard of review required for a chal-
lenge to an arbitrator's award under the Public Employe Re-
lations Act, I believe that the award can be rationally derived
from the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), using rea-
soning which differs only slightly from that upon which the
arbitrator relied ... The majority concludes that the Award
was not rationally derived from the CBA because it interfered
with the Board's discretionary hiring power. However, under
the "essence test," an arbitration award must be upheld if it
can, in any rational way, be derived from the CBA... The
award has a perfectly rational basis in the CBA and should be
upheld.9
While the majority accurately recited the language of the two-
prong Cheyney test and purported to apply it, Judge Friedman
194. Id. at 913. In agreeing that the topic was covered, and therefore arbitrable, under
the governing CBA, the Commonwealth Court reflected:
Article VIII, Section C, of the CBA states that "compensation for extra-duty assign-
ments to be provided under this agreement are reflected in Appendix C attached to
and incorporated in this agreement." Appendix C, entitled "Supplemental Pay
Schedule," lists all of the extra-duty assignments and their salaries. We believe the
words "to be provided under this agreement" make it clear that the parties negotiat-
ing the CBA intended that bargaining unit members would hold the extra-duty as-
signments. Indeed, the very term "extra-duty assignment" evidences this intent when
we consider the case of a non-bargaining unit member, not otherwise employed by
the District, who is chosen for such an assignment. In such a case, it would hardly be
appropriate to call the assignment "extra-duty" work; rather, it would be the only
work that person performed for the District.
Id. (emphasis in original).
195. Id. See supra note 194.
196. Apollo-Ridge, 799 A.2d at 915.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 916 (Friedman, J., concurring and dissenting).
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demonstrated a more accurate understanding of its contours.
Thus, while the majority paid lip service to the essence test, their
explanation of exactly why the arbitrator's award was not rational
left something to be desired. In this case, where the positions and
salaries at issue were specifically covered by the CBA, and the
parties traditionally treated the principal's suggestions for filling
the vacancies as binding, the arbitrator's conclusion that the
board violated the agreement seems highly rational. The Com-
monwealth Court did little more than assert its view that the
proposition was irrational, without delving deeper.
III. PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT
Also necessary to assess the success of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court's attempt, in Cheyney, to correct the course of the
essence test is an examination of that court's own subsequent ap-
plications of the circumscribed standard. This section seeks to
determine whether the state's highest court has stayed true to its
own established limitations in reviewing arbitral awards. For ob-
vious reasons, their consistency is most vital to the success of the
doctrine and the achievement of the policies underlying it.
As of the writing of this article, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has had only two occasions to apply the essence test since
their own instructions in Cheyney. What follows is a summary
and analysis of those two cases in chronological order.
Danville Area School District v. Danville Area Education Associa-
tion.99
Only seven months after authoring Cheyney, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, again in an opinion written by Justice Cappy, re-
versed a Commonwealth Court decision that vacated a labor arbi-
trator's award."'°
In Danville, after deciding to retire, a long-time teacher applied
for the benefits she was entitled to receive under the governing
CBA between her employer school district and the teachers un-
ion."' Although the school district conceded that she was entitled
to certain benefits under the CBA, the district denied her of some
199. 754 A.2d 1255 (Pa. 2000).
200. Danville, 754 A.2d at 1263
201. Id. at 1257.
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additional benefits that were allowed under one particular section
of the CBA for those retirees with 30 "years of service in public
education."20 2 This particular retiree had only served the school
district for 24 years.2 2 Nevertheless, the union filed a grievance
contesting the denial of these additional benefits.2"4 The union
contended that in computing time for determination of eligibility
for retirement benefits, the district had always used "PSERS cal-
culation of 'years of service' rather than the actual service time."2 5
Under that computation, the retiring teacher would have been
credited with well over 30 years of service.2 6
Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, the dispute
culminated in arbitration.2 7 The issue put to the arbitrator was
primarily for a construction of the phrase "years of service in pub-
lic education" found in the CBA provision granting the disputed,
extra benefits.2 8 The district argued that the term clearly and
unambiguously referred to actual years of service, while the union
contended that the phrase included time beyond that spent actu-
ally teaching and has traditionally included military service and
maternity leave. 29 Furthermore, the relevant section, according to
the union, had always been interpreted in the past to mean that
the years of service would be the same as those credited to an in-
dividual under the standards of PSERS, and that other teachers
within the school district had already received the additional
benefits according to their years of service according to PSERS
credits.21
The arbitrator considered the opposing contentions and found
the relevant language in the CBA to be ambiguous. 1' He also
found that in the past, teachers that had received the additional
benefits were credited with years according to PSERS.212 From
these circumstances, the arbitrator concluded that this practice
had been incorporated into the CBA and that the current retiree
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206. Id. at 1258.
207. Id. at 1257.
208. Id. at 1257-58.
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The district appealed to the court of common pleas.214 The court
of common pleas upheld the arbitrator's award. 1' The district ap-
pealed again to the Commonwealth Court.216
A panel of the Commonwealth Court reversed the arbitrator's
award.217 Primarily, they reversed because they found that the
arbitrator's award violated the Pennsylvania Constitution.1
However, they also suggested that because the collective bargain-
ing agreement did not expressly incorporate the practice of abid-
ing by PSERS standards into the CBA, the parties could not have
intended to be so bound. 9 The Commonwealth Court "deemed the
arbitrator's reference to the Retirement Code to be a unilateral
modification of the collective bargaining agreement."2 ' The Com-
monwealth Court reversed and vacated the arbitrator's award.221
The union appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.222
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court began its review by noting
that the "proper role of an appellate court in reviewing an arbitra-
tor's interpretation of the terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment is one of deference."223 The court went on to explain their
recent holdings in Cheyney:
We made clear that the court does not inquire into whether
the arbitrator's decision is reasonable or even manifestly un-
reasonable; rather, the question is whether the award may in
any way be rationally derived from the agreement between
the parties . . . The rationale behind this limited review is
that final and binding arbitration is a highly favored form of
dispute resolution and extremely important in the context of
labor relations. Unlike more traditional judicial resolution of
disputes, arbitration offers speed, low expense, and informal-
ity. Moreover, it has been pointed to as a prime factor in as-
suaging industrial strife. These great benefits would be
214. Id.
215. Danville, 754 A.2d at 1258.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. The Commonwealth Court determined that the use of amendments to the
PSERS standards to calculate entitlement to retirement benefits was in violation of the
Pennsylvania Constitution's, and the United States Constitution's prohibition against the
impairment of contracts through retroactive legislation. Id.
219. Id.
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eroded if courts were to assume a greater role in reviewing la-
bor arbitration awards.224
From there the court first considered the constitutional grounds
on which the Commonwealth Court based its reversal of the arbi-
tration award.225 On that issue, the court found that the Com-
monwealth Court improperly raised it sua sponte, noting that the
court will not reverse a judgment on a basis that was not raised
and preserved by the parties.2 6 But because the Commonwealth
Court also appeared to have found the arbitrator's award to be
violative of the essence test, the court moved on to consider that
227argument.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that the Com-
monwealth Court erred in its essence test analysis. 2 '8  Having
found the first prong of the Cheyney essence test satisfied, as enti-
tlement to retirement benefits was clearly governed within the
terms of the CBA, the court noted that according to prong two,
"the issue then becomes whether the arbitrator's interpretation
can in any rational way be derived from the agreement."229 Ac-
cording to the court, "[a]s to this question, when discerning the
intent of the parties, the arbitrator is not confined to the express
terms of the collective bargaining agreement."23" Furthermore,
"[o]ur court has stated that an arbitrator's award may draw its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement if the arbitra-
tor's 'interpretation can in any rational way be derived from the
agreement, viewed in light of its language, its context, and any
other indicia of the parties' intention."231' The court continued,
"[t]hus, where there is ambiguity, an arbitrator may attempt to
discern the intent of the parties, and thus, resolve a dispute over
contract interpretation, by considering the actions of the parties as
evidence of their interpretation of the terms of a collective bar-
gaining agreement. 32  Turning to the case at hand, the court ex-
plained that, "[i]n the case sub judice, the arbitrator was asked to
224. Id.
225. Danville, 754 A.2d at 1259. See supra note 218.
226. Id. at 1259-60.
227. Id. at 1260.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Danville, 754 A.2d at 1260.
231. Id. (citing Cheyney, 743 A.2d at 411, citing Cmty. Coll. of Beaver County, 375 A.2d
at 1275).
232. Danville, 754 A.2d at 1260.
Spring 2003 609
Duquesne Law Review
interpret ... [the section of the CBA providing for additional bene-
fits] . . . to determine the proper calculation of the [retiree's] bene-
fits." 3' According to past practice and two specific cases where
other teachers were granted the same additional benefits under
PSERS credit, the court found that the arbitrator's award was ra-
tional in light of the agreement and all surrounding circum-
stances.34 The court noted that the "School District fails to recog-
nize that it is not an appropriate role for an appellate court to
immerse itself into the fray and to reassess the judgment of the
arbitrator."2 5 In order to remain "[t]rue to the deferential essence
test, we will merely see if the interpretation can in any way be
rationally derived from the agreement."2 6 The court reversed the
decision of the Commonwealth Court and reinstated the arbitra-
tor's award.2 7
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion in Danville was
highly consistent with the views they had recently set forth in
Cheyney. This should not be too surprising, however, as Danville
was authored by Justice Cappy, the author of Cheyney. The evi-
dence and the language of the CBA were in the union's favor.
There was no feasible argument that the arbitrator's interpreta-
tion in this case was not rationally derived therefrom.
City of Easton v. American Federation of State, County and Mu-
nicipal Employees...
In City of Easton, an employee of the City of Easton's water
treatment facility was fired for "requesting and receiving pay for
hours not actually worked.., and neglecting his duties by failing
to treat the public water supply with the proper chemicals."23 9 The
union contested the termination according to a provision of the
CBA, which provided that:
Employees shall not be disciplined or discharged without just
cause. If an employee engages in willful misconduct or ne-
glect of duty that results in serious adverse consequences to
the contractor or to the city, including but not limited to costs
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1261.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Danville, 754 A.2d at 1262.
238. 756 A.2d 1107 (Pa. 2000).
239. City of Easton, 756 A.2d at 1108.
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of operation, fines, penalties or violations of any safety, health
or permit policies, regulations or requirements, the employee
may be immediately dismissed by the Project Manager. 4 °
The provisions then set forth a progressive discipline sequence."'
Pursuant to the CBA, the unresolved dispute proceeded to arbitra-
tion.
242
At the hearing, the city presented evidence to the arbitration
panel showing that the employee had been paid for the same
hours by the city and by a private employer, which also employed
him on a part-time basis.243 Also they presented evidence that the
employee repeatedly failed to add proper chemicals to the water.
2 "
Although the arbitrators found that the employee necessarily stole
from one employer or the other by falsifying time sheets, they
found that the city failed to prove which employer he had stolen
from.245 Although they concluded that the employee had neglected
his duties, this offense did not constitute just cause for his termi-
nation because the city could not prove that it was adversely af-
fected by it. 246 The arbitrators reinstated the employee with back
247pay.
The City of Easton sought review in the court of common pleas
claiming that the award was "manifestly unreasonable."248  The
court of common pleas refused to vacate the award. 249 The city
appealed to Commonwealth Court.25 °
At the Commonwealth Court level, the city argued that the
Board misinterpreted the terms of the CBA and that its finding of
fact that the employee had stolen time from one employer or the
other was contrary to their holding that the employee had not
committed willful misconduct.251  However, the Commonwealth
Court found that the arbitrators' decision "was reasonable and
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agreement because it rested on the board's unfettered interpreta-
tion of the term 'willful misconduct" and upheld the arbitrator's
award.252 The City of Easton appealed to the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court. 53
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court began its analysis by first
recognizing the governing standard to be the essence test as set
forth in Cheyney.254 Pursuant to the first prong of the test, the
court questioned and was satisfied that what constituted "willful
misconduct" was within the purview of the CBA.255 The court
turned to the second prong, whether the arbitrators' decision can
be rationally derived from the CBA, and found the prong unsatis-
fied.256 The court found meritorious the city's argument that the
arbitrators' determination that the city had failed to prove that
the employee committed "willful misconduct" was not rationally
derived from the CBA because it was contrary to their finding that
the employee stole time from one employer or the other.257 The
majority of the court agreed, explaining that the fact that there
was clearly a theft from one employer or the other was sufficient
to constitute willful misconduct under the CBA, and that any con-
trary conclusion was not rationally derived.258 The court ex-
plained, "the Board did not, as the majority of the Commonwealth
Court improperly assumed, have absolutely unfettered authority
to interpret the term 'willful misconduct' as it saw fit."2, 5 9 In addi-
tion, the majority held that Pennsylvania law had previously rec-
ognized the principle that governmental agencies do not have the
freedom to bargain away those powers that are essential to proper
discharge of their functions, including the power to terminate em-
ployees for theft.60 The fact that the arbitrators failed to take that
principle into consideration made their conclusions irrational, ac-
cording to the majority.26 ' The court reasoned that the arbitrators
must have necessarily found that the city had bargained this
power away.262 The court reversed the arbitrators' award.263
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. City of Easton, 756 A.2d at 1109-10.
255. Id. at 1110.
256. Id. at 1112.
257. Id. at 1110-12.
258. Id.
259. City of Easton, 756 A.2d at 1111.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1111-12,
263. Id. at 1113.
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Justice Cappy, the author of the well-written Cheyney and Dan-
ville opinions, dissented in City of Easton.264 Justice Cappy began:
Oftentimes, questionable decisions by lower tribunals present
the greatest challenge to an appellate court. They tempt the
court to stray from the sound jurisprudential foundation of
limited appellate review and entice the court to engage in de
novo review. This is especially true in the area of a court's
consideration of labor arbitration awards. Labor arbitrators
often render decisions that are most curious to those both in-
side and outside the labor arena, including those of us in the
judiciary. However, if this court is to remain true to its defer-
ential standard of review of labor arbitration awards, it must
resist the pull to vacate an award with which the court dis-
agrees, but which is nevertheless rationally derived from the
parties' collective bargaining agreement.
265
Justice Cappy continued:
Unfortunately, in this case, the majority has been lured into
substituting its own interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement for that of the arbitration panel selected by the
parties, and in doing so, vacates the arbitrators' award. Sim-
ply stated, I believe that the arbitration award in this case
passes the essence test. First, the issue of whether just cause
existed for the grievant's termination is contained within the
collective bargaining agreement. Furthermore, the arbitra-
tors' interpretation can be rationally derived from the lan-
guage and context of the agreement. Thus, I respectfully dis-
266sent.
Justice Cappy was more concerned with "the route by which the
majority vacate[d] the arbitration panel's award" than with the
"majority's failure to adhere to the essence test."267 In explanation,
Justice Cappy pointed out the fact that "[t]he majority base[d] its
opinion upon three cases decided in the 1980's which utilized the
concept of 'manifest unreasonableness' or 'reasonableness' to va-
264. City of Easton, 756 A.2d at 1113 (Cappy, J., dissenting). Justices Zappala and
Saylor joined in Justice Cappy's dissent. Id.
265. Id. (Cappy, J., dissenting) (empasis in original).
266. Id. (Cappy, J., dissenting).
267. Id. (Cappy, J., dissenting).
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cate arbitrators' awards."26 In addition, Justice Cappy noted,
these same cases, "for the first time, devised the concept that a
government agency does not have the freedom to 'bargain away'
matters, such as the discipline or dismissal of employees for cer-
tain conduct.""9 Justice Cappy asserted that the majority's reli-
ance upon those cases was misplaced for a number of reasons.27 °
His rationale went as follows:
First, these three cases, which all relied upon the concept of
reviewing an award for "manifest unreasonableness" or "rea-
sonableness," were rejected in our recent decision in State
System as being inconsistent with the deferential nature of
the essence test. Thus, because these cases which serve as
the foundation of the majority opinion were based upon an it-
eration of a standard that is no longer valid, I question their
value as precedent.27 '
Second, the premise upon which the majority opinion is based,
i.e., that a governmental entity may not bargain away those
powers that are essential to the proper discharge of its func-
tion, is also suspect. The majority contends that the City of
Easton (City) in this case did not have the freedom to relin-
quish its absolute right to terminate an employee who stole
from a third party while he was working for the City, i.e.,
bargain away the ultimate determination of the appropriate
discipline for theft.272
Justice Cappy proceeded to note that the origin of that legal
proposition is found in Philadelphia Housing Authority.273 In the
midst of vacating an arbitrator's award, the court in Philadelphia
Housing Authority stated, "it is manifestly unreasonable to con-
clude that the Housing Authority [(the governmental entity)]
could have intended to bargain away its absolute responsibility to
ensure the integrity of its housing security force by discharging an
officer who has defrauded one of the very people whom he is paid
to protect. '
268. Id. at 1113-14 (Cappy, J., dissenting).
269. City of Easton, 756 A.2d at 1114 (Cappy, J., dissenting).
270. Id. (Cappy, J., dissenting).
271. Id. (Cappy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
272. Id. (Cappy, J., dissenting).
273. Id. (Cappy, J., dissenting).
274. City of Easton, 756 A.2d at 1114 (Cappy, J., dissenting).
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To Justice Cappy's mind, the use of this "limitations on bargain-
ing principle, in the context of the now rejected 'manifestly unrea-
sonable' standard, render[ed] this legal proposition fatally
flawed."75 Justice Cappy contended that even if he himself were
willing to overlook this possibility, "close scrutiny of the statute on
which public employee grievance arbitration is based, the Penn-
sylvania Employee Relations Act (Act), [also] casts serious doubt
upon the validity of such a legal principle."276 For support, Justice
Cappy pointed specifically to Section 701 of the Act, which sets
forth the matters that are subject to collective bargaining (wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment),277 and Sec-
tion 702 of the Act which, conversely, sets forth those matters that
are not subject to collective bargaining (matters of inherent mana-
gerial policy).2 78  According to Justice Cappy, Section 702's exclu-
sions "include areas of discretion or policy such as the functions
and programs of the public employer, standards of services,
budget, utilization of technology, organizational structure, and
selection and direction of personnel."279 But more importantly,
Justice Cappy noted, "discipline and discharge are not specifically
prohibited as subjects of bargaining and at least one case from our
court has come to the conclusion that the 'dismissal' of employees
is a matter subject to collective bargaining."
280
275. Id. (Cappy, J., dissenting).
276. Id. (Cappy, J., dissenting).
277. Id. (Cappy, J., dissenting). In full, the pertinent statute reads as follows:
Collective bargaining is the performance of the mutual obligation of the public em-
ployer and the representative of the public employes to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement or any question arising thereunder
and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached but
such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession.
43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1101.701 (2002).
278. City of Easton, 756 A.2d at 1114 (Cappy, J., dissenting). In full, the pertinent stat-
ute reads as follows:
Public employers shall not be required to bargain over matters of inherent manage-
rial policy, which shall include but shall not be limited to such areas of discretion or
policy as the functions and programs of the public employer, standards of services, its
overall budget, utilization of technology, the organizational structure and selection
and direction of personnel. Public employers, however, shall be required to meet and
discuss on policy matters affecting wages, hours and terms and conditions of em-
ployment as well as the impact thereon upon request by public employe representa-
tives.
43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1101.702 (2002).
279. City of Easton, 756 A.2d at 1114-15 (Cappy, J., dissenting).
280. Id. at 1115 (Cappy, J., dissenting).
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Justice Cappy could have halted a convincing argument with
the above paraphrased points. Convinced of the majority's error,
however, he continued:
Additionally, the proposition that a public employer does not
have the freedom to bargain away discipline or dismissal for
certain conduct appears to be at odds with the test articulated
by our court used to determine whether a matter is, or is not,
a subject of bargaining. In PLRB v. State College Area School
Dist., this court proclaimed that "where an item of dispute is a
matter of fundamental concern to the employes' [sic] interest
in wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment, it is not removed as a matter subject to good faith bar-
gaining.. . ." Obviously, the parameters of discipline or dis-
missal are at the core of the employment relationship, and
clearly fall into the category of terms and conditions of em-
ployment, and thus, are a proper subject of collective bargain-
ing. As cogently noted by Justice Zappala in his dissent in In-
dependent State Stores Union, while there may be strong pol-
icy reasons why the legislature, or the Governor, may seek to
impose limitations upon agencies with respect to bargaining
over discipline for, inter alia, theft, they have not done so.
Thus, in the absence of any such dictate, or any limitation
found in a collective bargaining agreement, it appears that
the rights and obligations regarding discipline and dismissal
remain matters subject to collective bargaining and may be
interpreted and reviewed by an arbitrator.28'
Justice Cappy ended with the following argument in the alterna-
tive:
Finally, even assuming the viability of the legal proposition
created in Philadelphia Housing Authority regarding the lack
of freedom to bargain away the power to discipline or dismiss
employees for certain conduct, this principle of law is inappli-
cable to the facts in this case. In each of the three prior cases
in which this doctrine was utilized, the employee's conduct
was both illegal and directly related to the employee's role in
carrying out the employing agency's function. For example, in
281. Id. (Cappy, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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Philadelphia Housing Authority, a security officer was dis-
charged after committing fraud against one of the elderly pa-
tients with whom he was entrusted to protect. Likewise, in
Musser, two prison guards were terminated for their repeated
assault on an inmate under their vigil. Finally, in Independ-
ent State Stores Union, a liquor store manager was fired for
theft of store proceeds over which he had responsibility. Thus,
in each of these cases, the illegal act on the part of the em-
ployee was inextricably linked to the on-the-job conduct of the
employee and the function of the agency.282
Justice Cappy's dissent seems to be the more accurate of the
opinions. The relevant provision of the CBA was indeed ambigu-
ous. Interpretation of the term "willful misconduct," an undefined
term, should have been left to the arbitrator. No matter how un-
reasonable the arbitrator's interpretation that stealing from one
employer or the other while employed by the city was not "willful
misconduct" was, it was not irrational in the sense of the essence
test. In addition, the arbitrator could have rationally concluded
that the modifying language "adverse consequences to ... the city"
qualified that the "willful misconduct" had to have occurred in
performance of the city job. Finally, the arbitrator could have ra-
tionally concluded that if the city could not prove "willful miscon-
duct" in relation to the city job by at least a preponderance, there
could be no willful misconduct.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the cases discussed above, the Commonwealth Court appears
to have, for the most part, heeded the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's most recent instructions on the essence test in Cheyney.
The two possible exceptions are Rochester and Apollo-Ridge. In
those two opinions, as discussed earlier, the Commonwealth Court
seemed to stray a degree away from strict adherence to the es-
sence test and its principles. Both opinions reversed an arbitra-
tor's seemingly rationally drawn award.
As for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court itself, it is perhaps too
soon to tell whether they have come to a final resting point in
their discussion of the contours of the essence test. However, City
of Easton seems to strongly indicate that there is still some confu-
282. Id. (Cappy, J., dissenting).
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sion and disagreement among the members of the state's highest
court. This turmoil could quite possibly result in another Chey-
ney-esque opinion sometime in the indeterminate future.
None of the above analyses, specifically those regarding Roches-
ter, Apollo-Ridge, and City of Easton, should be construed to sug-
gest that any failure to uphold an arbitrator's award is always an
indication that a reviewing court has misapplied the essence test.
Those are not the contentions of this comment. Quite the con-
trary, this comment concedes that the very fires the essence test
was forged in recognized that arbitrators are not, and cannot be
considered inviolate.283 It is important that this fact is not forgot-
ten. Instead, this comment merely contends that reversal is cause
to look a bit more closely at a reviewing court's reasoning. These
cases turn on factual intricacies, and analysis of a court's reason-
ing is often hindered by the limited discussion of facts that appear
within some of the opinions. In sum, this comment seeks to sug-
gest that as part and parcel to a policy favoring alternative dis-
pute resolution in labor relations, any doubts as to the irrational-
ity of an arbitrator's award should tip the scales in favor of up-
holding. The Rochester, Apollo-Ridge, and City of Easton cases all
seem to contain legitimate doubts, which, perhaps, should have
tipped the scales.
Nicholas J. Zidik
283. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960). There, the United States Supreme Court, in its original essence test proclamations,
noted that "[n]evertheless, an arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the
collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial
justice." Id. at 597. The Court concluded that "[w]hen the arbitrator's words manifest an
infidelity to [his] obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award."
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